آزمون انتخاب بد در بازار بیمه پایه درمان ایران

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری علوم اقتصادی، پردیس بین الملل دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد

2 دانشیار گروه اقتصاد دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد

3 استادیار گروه اقتصاد دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد

چکیده

انتخاب بد زمانی نمایان می­شود که افراد بیمه‌شده اطلاعاتی درباره­ی ریسکشان دارند که به‌وسیله بیمه­گران مشاهده نمی­شود، در این حالت بیمه­گران توانایی تشخیص و ﺗﻤﯿـﺰ ﺻـﺤﯿﺢ ﻣﯿـﺰان رﯾـﺴﮏ ﻫﺮ ﯾﮏ از ﻣﺸﺘﺮﯾﺎﻧﺸﺎن را ﻧﺪارﻧﺪ و ﻣﺠﺒﻮر می­شوند ﮐﻪ ﻗـﺮارداد ﯾﮑـﺴﺎﻧﯽ را ﻣﺒﺘﻨﯽ ﺑﺮ ﻣﯿﺎﻧﮕﯿﻦ رﯾﺴﮏ ﮐﻞ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﯽ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﯾﺎﻧﺸﺎن اراﺋﻪ ﮐﻨﻨﺪ. واﺿﺢ اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ اراﺋﻪ ﭼﻨﯿﻦ ﻗـﺮارداد ﯾﮑـﺴﺎﻧﯽ، ﻧﺴﺒﺘﺎً ﺑﺮای ﻣﺸﺘﺮﯾﺎﻧﯽ ﮐﻪ رﯾﺴﮏﻫﺎی ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮی دارﻧﺪ ﺟﺬابﺗﺮ ﺑﻮده و در ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑـﺮای ﻣـﺸﺘﺮﯾﺎﻧﯽ ﮐـﻪ رﯾـﺴﮏ ﮐﻤﺘﺮی دارﻧﺪ، ﭼﻨﺪان ﺧﻮﺷﺎﯾﻨﺪ ﻧﯿﺴﺖ. این موضوع باعث می­شود به‌تدریج مشتریان کم­ریسک از صنعت بیمه خارج شوند. پیامد نهایی این خواهد بود که چنین شرایطی از به وجود آمدن یک تعادل باثبات در بازار جلوگیری کرده و این امکان را فراهم می­سازد که بازار به‌کلی در هم فرو ریزد. در پژوهش حاضر وجود پدیده انتخاب بد که از آثار جانبی اطلاعات نامتقارن است، در بازار بیمه درمان پایه در ایران بررسی و آزمون شده است. برای آزمون فرضیه پژوهش، یعنی تأیید وجود انتخاب بد از داده­های بودجه خانوار بین سال­های 93 و 94 استفاده شده است. تلاش شد مدل ایجاد شده تحت کمترین فروض پارامتریک باشد که بتواند به‌خوبی انتخاب بد را در بیمه خدمات درمانی مورد آزمون قرار دهد. همچنین برخلاف تمام مدل­های قبلی، عدم‌اطمینان از بازپرداخت و میزان آن در این مدل لحاظ شد که با واقعیت بسیار منطبق­تر است. نتایج حاکی از تأیید انتخاب بد در بیمه پایه درمان بیمه سلامت، خدمات درمانی و تأمین اجتماعی در ایران است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Adverse selection Test in Iran's Basic Health Insurance Market

نویسندگان [English]

  • nasim Arabian 1
  • Mehdi Khodaparast mashhadi 2
  • Masoud Homayounifar 2
  • mehdi feizi 3
  • vahid fakoor 3
1 PhD student at Mashhad Ferdowsi University
2 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
3 Assistant Professor Department of Economics, Ferdowsi university of Mashhad
چکیده [English]

Adverse selection appear when insured persons have information about their risk that is not observed by insurers. Under these circumstances, insurers are unable to identify customer risk and they are forced to offer the same contract based on the average of all their customers. It is clear that offering such a similar contract will be relatively more attractive to high-risk customers. In contrast, it is not very pleasant for customers who have less risk. This will gradually drive low-risk customers out of the insurance industry. The end result will be that such a situation will prevent a stable balance in the market and it allows the market to collapse completely. In the present study, the phenomenon of adverse selection, which is one of the side effects of asymmetric information, in the basic health insurance market in Iran, it has been studied and tested. To test the research hypothesis, that is, to confirm the existence of an adverse selection, household budget data between 1993 and 1994 have been used. Attempts have been made to make the model under the least parametric assumptions, to be able to test adverse selection in health insurance. Also, unlike all previous models, the uncertainty of repayment and its amount was considered in this model, which is much more consistent with reality. The results confirm the adverse selection in health insurance, health care and social security in Iran.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Poor selection
  • Asymmetric information
  • Basic health insurance
  • Information economics
  • Semi-parametric methods

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فصلنامه مطالعات اقتصادی کاربردی ایران
دوره 9، شماره 33
فروردین 1399
صفحه 93-111

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