Assessing the structure of the Iranian`s organized monetary market based on the approach of the multi-function product and multi-level effects pattern

Document Type : Research Article



The current paper seeks to examine the structure of Iranian`s organized monetary market based on multi-function product and multi-level effects pattern which in this regard, the economies of scope has been assessed by estimating multi-product translog cost function of Iranian`s organized monetary market. In this paper 18 active banks during 2008–15 were studied which they all formed the money market situation in Iran. To assess competition in banking industry, at first, by using the results of multi-level mixed effects model to assess the model of Iranian`s organized monetary market, Penrose andRoss model calculated. For assessing the reason of marketing power when there are multi-product offers. Changes in H statistics of Penrose and Ross due to existence of economies of scope in multi-products banking, estimated  and the change in statistic H suggests the exclusive power in organized monetary market of country. The findings show that with increasing of diversity of offered products by organized monetary market, the value of Penrose and Ross statistic H is lessened increasing of exclusive power as a result. Therefore, economic measure and scale in banking industry will result in marketing power and also banks with diversity in offering of products have a more exclusive power. To this regard, high degree of concentration in banking industry has highlighted two questions recently: first, regarding bank’s large scales, are whether those scale increase or not? If so is this advantage or obstacle for potential new banks to enter the industry? And second, whether those model banking scope has lead to increase banking power? Theory suggests that banking competition can be inferred directly from the markup of prices over marginal cost (Lerner, 1934). In prsctice, this measure is often hard or even impossible to implement due to a lock of detailed information on the costs and prices of bank products. The literature has proposed various indirect measurement techniques to assess the competitive climate in the banking sector.
The current paper derives a theoretical model that explicitly analyzes the behavior and conduct of a representative multi-product bank that enjoys economies of scope in supplying classic and other banking products. Frist step begin by extending Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) original model to the case of a multi-product bank with economies of scope, computing the multi-product Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic. Next, the current study shows how economies of scope in multi-product banks affect H-Statistics in the market for classical banking products. More specifically, we show that the greater the economies of scope for a multi-product bank, the lower the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic.
In addition, our estimates show that banks with any of the product profiles studied have greater market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results indicate that both financial and nonfinancial banking products can increase a bank’s market power. Future research could extend this project by investigating the causal effects of the positive relationship between market power and a bank’s decision to supply classic and other banking products. To summarize, our empirical models show that empirical studies that do not consider the economies of scope underestimate multi-product firms’competation in the banking markets. Moreover, an individual banking-level measure of economies of scope is created and included in Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) test. The initial view of product diversity is supported by banks and their customers, So banks by gaining customer satisfaction, they also gain market power through a variety of products though move to the exclusive atmosphere can have the consequences of reducing social welfare. 


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