The application of the bargaining game model to efficiency decomposition of the two-stage centralized model in Iranian banks

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد الیگودرز

2 IAU- shariar branch

3 دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی الیگودرز

4 IAU

10.22084/aes.2024.28759.3660

Abstract

The efficiency of banks in any country is a key factor in the growth and development of that country's economy. Recently, the evaluation and improvement of the efficiency of the banking industry in Iran has received a lot of attention. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the efficiency of selected Iranian banks in 2021. Although in many studies of the banking industry, classical DEA models have been used without considering the internal structure and partial processes of banks. To overcome the limitations of the classic DEA model, the use of network data envelopment analysis (NDEA) models with the Nash bargaining game approach is the innovation of this research. In this model, all the internal components of the process and its overall coherence are considered to evaluate the efficiency of partial processes and to identify the sources of inefficiency of the entire banking system. Another advantage of the results of these evaluations is that they can provide managers with sufficient management information to identify the causes and factors affecting efficiency and gain competitive advantages. The results show that only future banks, Middle East, Mellat Saderat, Tejarat, export development in both stages and the whole performance system are efficient. Bargaining game model has also been used to fairly analyze efficiency and identify the stage that caused inefficiency. According to the private bank's goal to earn profit, banks that do not perform properly have not been able to use their physical resources and capacities optimally to attract deposits and generate more profit.

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